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Abstract 
This paper presents a systematic solution to the per-
sistent problem of buffer overflow attacks. Buffer over-
flow attacks gained notoriety in 1988 as part of the Morris 
Worm incident on the Internet. While it is fairly simple 
to fix individual buffer overflow vulnerabilities, buffer 
overflow attacks continue to this day. Hundreds of at-
tacks have been discovered, and while most of the obvi-
ous vulnerabilities have now been patched, more sophis-
ticated buffer overflow attacks continue to emerge. 
We describe StackGuard: a simple compiler technique 
that virtually eliminates buffer overflow vulnerabilities 
with only modest performance penalties. Privileged pro-
grams that are recompiled with the StackGuard com-
piler extension no longer yield control to the attacker, 
but rather enter a fail-safe state. These programs require 
no source code changes at all, and are binary-compatible 
with existing operating systems and libraries. We de-
scribe the compiler technique (a simple patch to gee), 
as well as a set of variations on the technique that trade-
off between penetration resistance and performance. We 
present experimental results of both the penetration resis-
tance and the performance impact of this technique. 
"This research is partially supported by DARPA contracts F30602-
96-1-0331 and F30602-96-1-0302. 
I Ryerson Polytechnic University 
1 Introduction 
This paper presents a systematic solution to the per-
sistent problem of buffer overflow attacks. Buffer over-
flow attack gained notoriety in 1988 as part of the Morris 
Worm incident on the Internet (23]. Despite the fact that 
fixing individual buffer overflow vulnerabilities is fairly 
simple. buffer overflow attacks continue to this day, as re-
ported in the SANS Network Security Digest: 
Buffer overflows appear to be the most 
common problems reported in May, with 
degradation-of-service problems a distant sec-
ond. Many of the buffer overflow problems are 
probably the result of careless programming, 
and could have been found and corrected by 
the vendors, before releasing the software, if 
the vendors had performed elementary testing 
or code reviews along the way. ( 4] 
The base problem is that, while individual buffer over-
flow vulnerabilities are simple to patch, the vulnerabili-
ties are profligate. Thousands of Hnes of legacy code are 
still running as privileged daemons (SUID root) that 
contain numerous software errors. New programs are be-
ing developed with more care, but are often still devel-
oped using unsafe languages such as C, where simple er-
rors can leave serious vulnerabilities. 
The continued success of these attacks is also due to 
the "patchy" nature by which we protect against such at-
tacks. The life cycle of a buffer overflow attack is simple: 
A (malicious) user finds the vulnerability in a highly priv-
ileged program and someone else implements a patch to 
that particular attack, on that privileged program. Fixes 
to buffer overflow attacks attempt to solve the problem at 
the source (the vulnerable program) instead of at the des-
tination (the stack that is being overflowed). 
This paper presents StackGuard, a systematic solution 
to the buffer overflow problem. StackGuard is a simple 
compiler extension that limits the amount of damage that 
a buffer overflow attack can inflict on a program. Pro-
grams compiled with StackGuard are safe from buffer 
overflow attack, regardless of the software engineering 
quality of the program. 
Section 2 describes buffer overflow attacks in detail. 
Section 3 details how StackGuard defends against buffer 
overflow attacks. Section 4 presents performance and 
penetration testing of StackGuard-enhanced programs. 
Section 5 discusses some ofthe abstract ideas represented 
in StackGuard, and their implications. Section 6 de-
scribes related work in defending against buffer overflow 
attack. Finally, Section 7 presents our conclusions. 
2 Buffer Overflow Attacks 
Buffer overflow attacks exploit a lack of bounds check-
ing on the size of input being stored in a buffer array. 
By writing data past the end of an allocated array, the at-
tacker can make arbitrary changes to program state stored 
adjacent to the array. By far, the most common data struc-
ture to corrupt in this fashion is the stack, called a "stack 
smashing attack," which we briefly describe here, and is 
described at length elsewhere [15, 17,21]. 
Many C programs have buffer overflow vulnerabil-
ities, both because the C language lacks array bounds 
checking, and because the culture of C programmers en-
courages a performance-oriented style that avoids error 
checking where possible [14, 13]. For instance, many 
of the standard C library functions such as gets and 
strcpy do not do bounds checking by default. 
The common form of buffer overflow exploitation is 
to attack buffers allocated on the stack. Stack smashing 
attacks strive to achieve two mutually dependent goals, 
illustrated in Figure 1: 
OxFFFF 
Stack 
Growth 
OxOOOO 
Process Address Space 
Top of Stack 
Attack Code 
Return Address 
i Local Variables ... 
buffer 
J. 
I String 
Growth 
Figure 1: Stack Smashing Buffer Overflow Attack 
Inject Attack Code The attacker provides an input 
string that is actually executable, binary code 
native to the machine being attacked. Typically 
this code is simple, and does something similar to 
exec ( "sh") to produce a root shell. 
Change the Return Address There is a stack frame for 
a currently active function above the buffer being at-
tacked on the stack. The buffer overflow changes 
the return address to point to the attack code. When 
the function returns, instead of jumping back to 
where it was called from, it jumps to the attack code. 
The programs that are attacked using this technique are 
usually privileged daemons; programs that run under the 
user-ID of root to perform some service. The injected 
attack code is usually a short sequence of instructions that 
spawns a shell, also under the user-ID of root. The ef-
fect is to give the attacker a shell with root's privileges. 
If the input to the program is provided from a locally 
running process, then this class of vulnerability may al-
low any user with a local account to become root. More 
distressing, if the program input comes from a network 
connection, this class of vulnerability may allow any user 
anywhere on the network the ability to become root on 
the local host. Thus while new instances of this class of 
attack are not intellectually interesting, they are none the 
less critical to practical system security. 
Engineering such an attack from scratch is non-trivial. 
Often, the attacks are based on reverse-engineering the 
attacked program, so as to determine the exact offset from 
the buffer to the return address in the stack frame, and the 
offset from the return address to the injected attack code. 
However, it is possible to soften these exacting require-
ments [17]: 
• The location of the return address can be approxi-
mated by simply repeating the desired return address 
several times in the approximate region of the return 
address. 
• The offset to the attack code can be approximated by 
prepending the attack code with an arbitrary number 
ofNOP instructions. The overwritten return address 
need only jump into the middle of the field ofNOPs 
to hit the target. 
The cook-book descriptions of stack smashing at-
tacks [15, 17, 21] have made construction of buffer-
overflow exploits quite easy. The only remaining work 
for a would-be attacker to do is to find a poorly protected 
buffer in a privileged program, and construct an exploit. 
Hundreds of such exploits have been reported in recent 
years [4]. 
3 StackGuard: Making the Stack Safe for 
Network Access 
StackGuard is a compiler extension that enhances the 
executable code produced by the compiler so that it 
detects and thwarts buffer-overflow attacks against the 
stack. The effect is transparent to the normal function 
of programs. The only way to notice that a program is 
StackGuard-enhanced is to cause it to execute C state-
ments with undefined behavior: StackGuard-enhanced 
programs define the behavior of writing to the return ad-
dress of a function while it is still active. 
As described in Section 2, the common form of buffer-
overflow attacks are stack smashers. They function by 
overflowing a buffer that is allocated on the stack, inject-
ing code onto the stack, and changing the return address 
to point to the injected code. StackGuard thwarts this 
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Figure 2: Canary Word Next to Return Address 
class of attack by effectively preventing changes to the 
return address while the function is still active. If the re-
turn address cannot be changed, then the attacker has no 
way of invoking the injected attack code, and the attack 
method is thwarted. 
StackGuard prevents changes to active return ad-
dresses by either detecting the change of the return ad-
dress before the function returns, or by completely pre-
venting the write to the return address. Detecting changes 
to the return address is a more efficient and portable 
technique, while preventing the change is more secure. 
StackGuard supports both techniques, as well as adap-
tively switching from one mode to the other. 
Section 3.1 describes how StackGuard detects changes 
to the return address. Section 3.2 describes how Stack-
Guard prevents changes to the return address. Section 3.3 
discusses motives and methods for adaptively switching 
between techniques. 
3.1 Detecting Return Address Cbange Before 
Return 
To be effective, detecting that the return address has 
been altered must happen before a function returns. 
StackGuard does this by placing a "canary"l word next 
I A direct descendent of the Welsh miner's canary. 
to the return address on the stack, as shown in Figure 2. 
When the function returns, it first checks to see that 
the canary word is intact before jumping to the address 
pointed to by the return address word. 
This approach assumes that the the return address is 
unaltered IFF the canary word is unaltered. While this as-
sumption is not completely true in general (stray pointers 
can alter any word), it is true of buffer overflow attacks. 
The buffer overflow attack method exploits the fact that 
the return address word is located very close to a byte ar-
ray with weak bounds checking, so the only tool the at-
tacker has is a linear, sequential write of bytes to mem-
ory, usually in ascending order. Under these restricted 
circumstances, it is very difficult to over-write the return 
address word without disturbing the canary word. 
The StackGuard implementation is a very simple patch 
to gcc 2.7.2.2. The gcc function_prologue and 
function.epilogue functions have been altered to 
emit code to place and check canary words. The changes 
are architecture-specific (in our case, i3B6), but since 
the total changes are under 100 lines of gcc, portabil-
ity is not a major concern. All the changes in the gcc 
calling conventions are undertaken by the callee, so code 
compiled with the StackGuard-enhanced gcc is com-
pletely inter-operable with generic gcc . 0 files and li-
braries. The additional instructions added to the function 
prologue are shown in pseudo-assembly form in Figure 3, 
and the additional instructions added to the instruction 
epilogue are shown in Figure 4. Section 4 describes test-
ing and performance of this patch. 
3.1.1 Randomizing the Canary 
The Canary defense is sufficient to stop most buffer over-
flow attacks that are oblivious to the canary. In fact, sim-
ply changing the compiler's calling conventions is suf-
ficient to stop most buffer overflow attacks [8]. Most 
current buffer overflow attacks are quite brittle, mak-
ing specific, static assumptions about the layout of the 
stack frame. However, it is not very hard for attackers 
to develop buffer overflows that are insensitive to minor 
changes in the stack frame layout [17]: 
• To adapt to changes in the location of the return ad-
dress relative to the buffer being overflowed, the at-
tacker can repeat the new value several times in the 
input string. 
• To adapt to imprecision in the offset of the injected 
code from the current program counter, the attacker 
can inject attack code consisting of many NOPs, and 
simply jump to somewhere in the middle of the NOP 
sequence. Control flow will then drop down to the 
attack code. 
• To adapt to changes in alignment, the attacker need 
only guess 4 times at most to get the alignment cor-
rect. 
It is also possible to write attacks specifically designed 
to overcome StackGuard.2 There are two ways to over-
come the Canary method of detecting buffer overflows: 
1. Skip over the canary word. If the attacker can lo-
cate a poorly checked copy of an array of structs, 
which have alignment requirements, and are not big 
enough to fulfill the alignment requirements while 
densely packing the array, then it is possible that the 
copy could occur such that the canary word is in one 
of the holes left in the array. We expect this form of 
vulnerability to be rare, and difficult to exploit. 
2. Simulate the canary word. If the attacker can easily 
guess the canary value, then the attack string can in-
clude the canary word in the correct place, and the 
check at the end of the function. If the canary word 
is completely static, then it is very easy to guess. 
This form of attack is problematic. 
To deal with easily-guessed canaries, we use randomly 
chosen canary values. Our current implementation en-
hances the crtO library to choose a set of random ca-
nary words at the time the program starts. These random 
words are then used as distinct random canary words, one 
per function in the object code. While it is not impossible 
to guess such a canary value, it is difficult: the attacker 
must be able to examine the memory image of the running 
process to get the randomly selected word. Even so, a de-
termined attacker could break such a defense eventually; 
we discuss our approach to this problem in Section 3.3. 
2 Naturally, none have been found to date ;-) 
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Figure 3: Function Prologue Code: Laying Down a Canary 
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Figure 4: Function Epilogue Code: Checking a Canary 
3.2 Preventing Return Address Changes With 
MemGuard 
The Synthetix project [18, I, 2, 24] introduced a no-
tion called "quasi-invariants." Quasi-invariants are state 
properties that hold true for a while, but may change 
without notice. Quasi-invariants are used to speciry op-
timistic specializations; code optimizations that are valid 
only while the quasi-invariants hold. We have extended 
this work to treat return addresses on the stack as quasi-
invariant during the activation lifetime of the function. 
The return address is read-only (invariant) while the func-
tion is active, thus preventing effective buffer overflow 
against the stack. 
MemGuard [3] is a tool developed to help debug op-
timistic specializations by locating code statements that 
change quasi-invariant values. MemGuard provides fine-
grained memory protection: individual words of memory 
(quasi-invariant terms) can be designated as read-only, 
except when explicitly written via the MemGuard API. 
We have used MemGuard to produce a more secure, if 
less performant, version of the StackGuard compiler. 
MemGuard is used to prevent buffer overflow at-
tacks by protecting a return address when a function 
is called, and un-protecting the return address when 
the function returns. The protection and un-protection 
occur in precisely the same places as the canary 
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Figure 5: Function Prologue Code; Protecting the Return 
Address With MemGuard 
placement and checks described in Section 3.1: the 
function_prologue and function.epilogue 
functions. Figure 5 shows the prologue code sequence 
for MemGuard. The epilogue code sequence is identical, 
but uses system call 165 instead of 164. 
MemGuard is implemented by marking virtual mem-
ory pages containing quasi-invariant terms as read-only, 
and installing a trap handler that catches writes to pro-
tected pages, and emulates the writes to non-protected 
words on protected pages. The cost of a write to a 
non-protected word on a protected page is approximately 
1800 times the cost of an ordinary write. This is an ac-
ceptable cost when quasi-invariant terms are in quiet por-
tions of the kernel's address space, and when MemGuard 
is primarily used for debugging. 
This cost is not acceptable when the protected words 
are located near the top of the stack, next to some of the 
most frequently written words in the program. Mem-
Guard was originally designed to protect variables within 
the kernel. To protect the stack, MemGuard had to be ex-
tended in several ways: 
• Extend VM model to protect user pages. 
• Deal with the performance penalties due to "false 
sharing" caused by frequent writes to words near the 
return address. 
• Provide a light-weight system-call interface to 
MemGuard. Loading virtual memory hardware is a 
privileged operation, and so the application process 
must trap to kernel mode to protect a word. 
Most of these extensions are simple software devel-
opment, but the performance problems are challenging. 
Fortunately, the Pentium processor has four "debug" reg-
isters. These registers can be configured to watch for 
read, write, and execute access to the virtual address 
loaded into each register, and generate an exception when 
such access occurs. 
We use these registers as a cache of the most recently 
protected return addresses. The goal is to eliminate the 
need for the top-most page of the stack to be read-only, 
to eliminate page faults resulting from writes to variables 
at the top ofthe stack. Because of the locality behavior of 
stack variables, restoring write privileges to the top ofthe 
stack should handle most of the writes to stack variables. 
It is only probabilistically true that protecting the four 
most recent return addresses will capture all protection 
needs for the top of the stack. However, if the compiler 
is adjusted to emit stack frames with a minimum size of 
1/4 of a page, then it is always true that 4 registers will 
cover the top page. The time/space trade-off implied by 
this approach can be continuously adjusted, reducing the 
minimum size of stack frames to reduce space consump-
tion, and also increasing the probability that the top page 
of the stack actually will require MemGuard protection, 
with its associated costs. 
3.3 Adaptive Defense Strategies 
StackGuard is a product of the Immunix project [11], 
whose focus is adaptive responses to security threats. 
Thus we provide an adaptive response to intrusions, 
switching between the more performant Canary version, 
and the more robust MemGuard versions of Stack Guard. 
The basic model of operation for StackGuard is that 
when a buffer overflow is detected, either by the Canary 
or by MemGuard, the process is terminated. The process 
must exit, because an unknown amount of state has al-
ready been corrupted at the time the attack is detected, 
and so it is impossible to safely recover the state of the 
process. Thus the process exits, using only static data and 
code, so as to avoid any possible corruption from the at-
tacker. 
Replacing the dead process is context-dependent. In 
many cases, it suffices to just let inetd re-start the dae-
mon when a connection requests service. However, if the 
daemon is not managed by inetd, then it may be neces-
sary for a watch-dog process to re-start the daemon, most 
especially in the case of inetd itself. 
It is also possible for these re-start mechanisms to 
adaptively select which form of protection to use next. 
The Canary and MemGuard variants of StackGuard of-
fer different points in the trade-off between security and 
performance. The Canary version is more performant, 
while the MemGuard version is more secure (see Sec-
tion 4). More specifically, the important security vulner-
ability in the Canary variant is that it is potentially subject 
to guessing of the canary value. The Canary variant can 
defend itself against guessing by exiting, and replacing 
the attacked Canary-guarded daemon with a MemGuard-
guarded daemon. 
This adaptive response allows systems to run in a rela-
tively high-performance state most of the time, and adap-
tively switch to a lower-performance, higher-security 
state when under attack. At worst, the attacker can 
carry out a degradation-of-service attack by periodically 
attacking daemons, forcing them to run in the lower-
performance MemGuard mode most of the time. How-
ever, service is not totally denied, because the daemons 
continue to function, and the attacker no longer is able to 
obtain illegitimate privilege via buffer overflow attack. 
4 Experimental Results 
This section describes experimental evaluation of 
StackGuard. Subsection 4.1 describes penetration exper-
iments, to show StackGuard's effectiveness in deterring 
past and future attacks. of Subsection 4.2 describes the 
performance cost of StackGuard under various circum-
stances. 
4.1 StackGuard Effectiveness 
Here we illustrate StackGuard's effectiveness in 
thwarting stack smashing buffer overflow attacks. 
StackGuard is intended to thwart generic stack smashing 
attacks, even those that have not yet appeared. To 
simulate that, we sought out buffer overflow exploits, 
and tried them against their intended software targets, 
with and without protection from StackGuard. Table 1 
summarizes these results. 
The programs listed in Table I are conventionally in-
stalled as SUID root. If the attacker can get one of 
these programs to start a shell, then the attacker gets a 
root shell. 
In each case, the experiment is to install the vulnerable 
program SUID root (SUID httpd for wwwcount) 
and attack it with the exploit. We then re-compile the pro-
gram with the Canary variant of StackGuard, re-install 
the StackGuard-enhanced program as SUID root, and 
attack it again with the exploit. We did not alter the 
source code of any of the vulnerable programs at all, and 
StackGuard has no specific knowledge of any of these at-
tacks. Thus this experiment simulates the effect of Stack-
Guard defending against unknown attacks. 
In all cases we have studied, both the Canary and the 
MemGuard variants of StackGuard stopped what would 
have been an attack that obtains a root shell. Several 
cases deserve special discussion: 
umount 2. Ski 1 ibc S. 3 . 12: The buffer over-
flow vulnerability is actually in Hbc, and not 
in umount. Simply re-compiling umount with 
either varian t of StackGuard does not suffice to stop 
the attack. However, when 1 ibc is also compiled 
using StackGuard (either variant) then the attack is 
defeated. Thus for full protection, either the system 
shared libraries must be protected with StackGuard, 
or the privileged programs must be statically linked 
with libraries that are protected with StackGuard. 
SuperProbe: This attack does not actually attack the 
function return address. Rather, it over-writes a 
function pointers in the program that is allocated on 
the stack. The Canary variant stopped the attack by 
perturbing the layout of the stack, but an adjusted at-
tack produced a root shell even with Canary pro-
tection. The MemGuard variant stopped the attack 
because a return address was in the way ofthe buffer 
overflow. Proper treatment of this kind of attack re-
quires an extension to StackGuard, as described in 
Section 5.4. 
Perl: Like SuperProbe, the Perl attack does not 
attack the function return address. This attack over-
writes data structures in the global data area, and 
thus is not properly a "stack smashing" attack. Per-
mutations in the alignment of the global data area 
induced by the StackGuard's vector of canary val-
ues prevented the attack from working, but a mod-
ified form of the attack produced a root shell de-
spite Canary protection. MemGuard had no effect 
on the attack. 
Samba, wwwcount: These buffer overflow vulnerabil-
ities were announced after the StackGuard com-
piler was developed, yet the StackGuard-enhanced 
versions of these programs were not vulnerable to 
the attacks. This illustrates the point that Stack-
Guard can effectively prevent attacks even against 
unknown vulnerabilities. 
We would like the list of programs studied to be larger. 
Two factors limit this kind of experimentation: 
Obtaining the Exploit: It is difficult to obtain the ex-
ploit code for attacking programs. Security orga-
nizations such as CERT are reluctant to release ex-
ploits, and thus most of these exploits were obtained 
either from searching the web, or from the bugtraq 
mailing list [16]. 
Obtaining Vulnerable Source Code: Buffer overflow 
attacks exploit specific, simple vulnerabilities in 
popular software. Because of the severe security 
Vulnerable Result Without Result With I Result With 
Program StackGuard Canary Stack Guard MemGuard StackGuard 
dip 3.3.7n root shell program halts program halts 
elm 2.4 PL25 root shell program halts program halts 
Perl 5.003 root shell program halts irregularly root shell 
Samba root shell program halts program halts 
SuperProbe root shell program halts irregularly program halts 
umount 2. 5k1libc 5.3.12 root shell program halts program halts 
wwwcount v2.3 httpdshell program halts program halts 
zgv 2.7 root shell program halts program halts 
Table 1: Protecting Vulnerable Programs with StackGuard 
risks posed, and the ease of patching the individ-
ual vulnerability, new releases appear soon after 
the vulnerability is publicized. Moreover, the 
vulnerability is often not publicized until it can 
be announced with a patch in hand. The older 
vulnerable source code is often not easily available. 
We have begun archiving source code versions, 
so that we will be able to add experiments as new 
vulnerabilities appear. 
4.2 StackGuard Overhead 
This section describes experiments to study the per-
formance overhead imposed by StackGuard. Note that 
StackGuard need only be used on programs that are surD 
root, and such programs are not usually consumers 
of large amounts of CPU time. Thus it is only neces-
sary that the overhead be sufficiently low that the priv-
ileged administrative daemons do not impose a notice-
able compute load. The MemGuard and Canary variants 
of StackGuard impose different kinds of overhead, and 
so we microbenchmark them separately in Sections 4.2.1 
and 4.2.2. Section 4.2.3 presents macrobenchmark per-
formance data. 
4.2.1 Canary StackGuard Overhead 
The Canary mechanism imposes additional cost at two 
points in program execution: 
• function prologue: there is a small cost in pushing 
the canary word onto the stack. 
• function epilogue: there is a moderate cost in check-
ing that the canary word is intact before performing 
the function return. 
We model this cost as a % overhead per function call. 
The % overhead is a function of the base cost of a func-
tion call, which varies depending on the number of argu-
ments and the return type, so we studied a range offunc-
tion types. 
The experiments seek to discover the % overhead of 
a function call imposed by StackGuard. We did this by 
writing a C program that increments a statically allocated 
integer 500,000,000 times. The base case is just "i++", 
and the experiments use various functions to increment 
the counter. The results are shown in Table 2. All ex-
periments were performed on a 200 MHz Pentium-S with 
512K of level 2 cache, and 128M of main memory. 
The "i++" is the base case, and thus has no % over-
head. The "void inc ()" entry is a function that does 
i++ where i is a global variable; this shows the over-
head of a zero-argument vo i d function, and is the worst-
possible case, showing a 125% overhead on function 
calls. The "void inc (int *)" entry is a function 
that takes an int * argument and increments it as a side-
effect; this shows that there is 69% overhead on a one-
argument void function. The Hint inc (int) " en-
try is an applicative function that takes an int argument, 
and returns that value + 1; this shows that the overhead of 
a one-argument function returning an int is 80%. 
Increment Standard! Canary ! % 
Method Run-Time • Run-Time Overhead 
i++ 15.1 15.1 NA 
void inc () 35.1 60.2 125% 
void ine(int *) 47.7 70.2 69% 
int inc (int) 40.1 60.2 80% 
Table 2: Microbenchmark: Canary Function Call Overhead 
Numerous other experiments are possible, but they all 
increase the base cost of function calls, while the cost 
of the Canary mechanism remains fixed at 7 instructions 
(see Figures 3 and 4), decreasing the Canary % overhead. 
Thus these overhead micro benchmarks can be considered 
an upper-bound on the cost of the Canary compiler. 
4.2.2 MemGuard StackGuard Overhead 
The MemGuard variant of StackGuard suffers substan-
tial performance penalties compared to the Canary vari-
ant, for reasons described in Section 3.2. Section 4.1 
showed that the MemGuard variant provides better secu-
rity protection for stack attacks than the Canary variant 
(specifically, MemGuard stopped the SuperProbe at-
tack, and guessing canary values will not help get past 
MemGuard). This section measures the cost of that added 
protection. 
The MemGuard variant of Stack Guard is still under de-
velopment, but as of this writing, we have some prelimi-
nary results. We have measured the performance of two 
versions of MemGuard StackGuard: 
MemGuard Register This version uses only the Pen-
tium's debugging registers for protection, so only 
the four most recent function calls' return addresses 
are protected. This version pays no penalty for page 
protection faults induced by protecting the stack 
with virtual memory protection. NOTE: this ver-
sion stopped all of the stack smashing attacks that 
we tested3 • 
MemGuard VM This version uses the virtual memory 
page protection scheme described in Section 3.2. It 
3 Except Perl. which is not really a stack smashing attack. 
has not fully exploited the optimization of using the 
debugging registers as a cache, to keep the top page 
of the stack writable. Thus this version suffers sub-
stantial performance penalties due to a large number 
of page protection faults. 
Table 3 shows the overhead costs for the MemGuard 
variant of StackGuard. Because of the use of a heavy-
weight system call to access privileged hardware for pro-
tection, function calls slow down by 70 x for the Mem-
Guard Register protection. The additional penalty of 
page protection fault handling for false sharing of the 
page on the top of the stack raises the cost of function 
calls by 160 x. Proper use of the debugging registers as 
a cache for the VM mechanism should bring the costs in 
line with the MemGuard Register costs. 
4.2.3 StackGuard Macrobenchmarks 
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 present microbenchmark re-
sults on the additional cost of function calls in pro-
grams protected by StackGuard. However, these mea-
surements are upper bounds on the real costs of running 
programs under StackGuard; the true penalty of running 
Stack Guard-enhanced programs is the overall cost, not 
the microbenchmark cost. We have benchmarked two 
programs: ctags, and the StackGuard-enhanced gee 
compiler itself. 
The etags program constructs an index of C source 
code. It is 3000 lines of C source code, comprising 68 
separate functions. When run over a small set of source 
files (78 files, 37,000 lines of code) with a hot buffer 
cache, etags is completely compute-bound. When run 
over a large set offiles (1163 files, 567,000 lines of code) 
etags it is still compute-bound, because of the large 
Increment Standard MemGuard Register % MemGuardVM % 
Method Run-Time Run-Time Overhead Run-Time Overhead 
i++ 15.1 15.1 NA NA NA 
void ine () 35.1 1808 8800% 34,900 174,300% . 
void ine(int *) 47.7 1820 5400% 40,420 123,800% 
int ine(int) 40.1 ; 1815 7000% 41,610 166,200% 
Table 3: Microbenchmark: MemGuard Function Call Overhead 
amount of RAM in our test machine. 
On a smaller machine, the test becomes I/O bound, 
consuming 50% of the CPU's time, so it is approximately 
balanced. While the Canary variant still consumes more 
CPU time than the generic program, it is overlapped with 
disk I/O, and the program completes in the same amount 
of real time. The MemGuard variants consume so much 
CPU time that the program's real time is dramatically im-
pacted. 
Table 4 shows etag's run-time in these two cases. 
The Canary variant's performance penalties are moder-
ate, at 80% for the small case, and 42% for the large 
case. The MemGuard Register penalties are substantial, 
at II 00% for the small case, and 1000% for the large 
case. The MemGuard VM performance penalties are pro-
hibitive, at 46,000% for the small case, and 36,000% for 
the large case. 
Table 5 shows a similar experiment for the run-time 
of a StackGuard-protected gee compiler. We thus use a 
Stack Guard-protected gee to measure the performance 
cost of StackGuard for a large and complex program. 
To be clear, the experiment measures the cost of run-
ning gee protected by StackGuard, and only incidentally 
measures the cost of adding StackGuard protection to the 
compiled program. 
Table 5 shows the time to compile etags using gee 
enhanced with StackGuard. Because there is more com-
putation per function call for gee than etags, this time 
the costs are lower. The Canary version consumes only 
6% more CPU time, and only 7% more real time. The 
MemGuard variants benefited as well; the Register ver-
sion's additional real time cost is 214%, and the VM ver-
sion's additional cost is 5100%. 
Recall that the StackGuard protective mechanism is 
only necessary on privileged administrative programs. 
Such programs present only a minor portion of the com-
pute load on a system, and so the StackGuard overhead 
will have only a modest impact on the total system load. 
Thus the overhead measured here could be considered 
within reason for heightened security, without a signifi-
cant change in the administrative complexity of the sys-
tem. We discuss administration of StackGuard in Sec-
tion 5. 
5 Discussion 
This section discusses some ofthe abstract ideas repre-
sented in Stack Guard, and their implications. Section 5.1 
describes how Stack Guard can help defend against fu-
ture attacks. Section 5.2 describes potential adminis-
tration and configuration techniques for systems using 
StackGuard. Section 5.3 describes some possible perfor-
mance optimizations. Section 5.4 describes future en-
hancements to StackGuard. 
5.1 Defending Against Future Attacks 
Fundamentally, the attacks that StackGuard prevents 
are not very interesting. They are serious security faults 
that result from minor programming errors. Once dis-
covered, fixing each error is easy. The significant contri-
bution that StackGuard makes is not only that it patches 
a broad collection of existing faults, but rather that it 
patches a broad collection offuture faults that have yet 
to be discovered. That StackGuard defeats the attacks 
against Samba and wwweount discovered after Stack-
Guard was produced is testament to this effect. 
Input I Version I User Time I System Time I Real Time I 
37,000 lines Generic 0041 0.14 0.55 I 
Canary 0.68 0.13 0.99 • 
MemGuard Register 1.30 5.45 6.84 
MemGuard VM 16.5 238.0 255.1 
586,000 lines Generic 7.74 2.08 10.2 
Canary 11.9 2.07 14.5 
MemGuard Register 21.1 91.5 115.0 
I MemGuardVM 236 3482 i 3728 
Table 4: Macrobenchmark: etags 
Version I User Time I System Time I Real Time 
i Generic 1.70 0.12 1.83 I 
Canary 1.79 0.16 1.96 ! 
MemGuard Register 2.22 3.35 5.76 I 
MemGuardVM 8.17 87.7 96.2 I 
Table 5: Macrobenchmark: gee of the etags program 
Using StackGuard does not eliminate the need to fix 
buffer overflow vulnerabilities, but by converting root 
vulnerabilities into mild degradation-of-service attacks, 
it does eliminate the urgency to fix them. This gives soft-
ware developers the breathing room to fix buffer over-
flows when it is convenient (i.e. when the next release is 
ready) rather than having to rush to create and distribute a 
patch. More importantly, StackGuard eases security ad-
ministration by relieving the system administrators of the 
need to apply these patches as soon as they are released, 
often several times a month. 
5.2 Administration and Confignration 
The adaptive response described in Section 3.3 re-
quires management: StackGuard causes programs to give 
notice that they need to be replaced because they have 
been (unsuccessfully) attacked, but does not make policy 
about what version, if any, to replace it with. 
Different policy decisions will have different impli-
cations; switching to a higher level of protection will 
drastically reduce performance, yet failure to switch can 
lead to successful penetration via guessing. The deci-
sion to revert to the more performant, less secure mode 
is even more difficult, because the attacker may try to 
induce such a switch. Making the right choice. auto-
matically, is challenging. We propose to create a small, 
domain-specific language [19] for specifying these pol-
icy choices. 
StackGuard comes with a performance price, and can 
be viewed as an insurance policy. If one is very sure that 
a program is correct, I.e. contains no buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities because it has been verified using formal 
methods, or a validation tool [9], then the program can be 
re-compiled and installed without benefit of StackGuard. 
Stack Guard offers powerful protection of any program 
compiled with the StackGuard compiler, but does nothing 
for programs that have not been thus compiled. However, 
tools such as COPS [7], which search for programs that 
should not be SUlD root, can be configured to look for 
programs that are SUlD root, and have not been com-
piled using StackGuard or some other security verifica-
tion tool [9]. If COPS reports that all SUID root pro-
grams on a machine have been protected, then one can 
have some degree of assurance that the machine is not 
vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. 
5.3 Performance Optimizations 
Section 4.2.2 mentions that a light-weight trap to ker-
nel mode can reduce the overhead of the MemGuard 
mechanism. However, it is also possible for the compiler 
to optimize StackGuard performance, both for the Mem-
Guard and Canary variants. 
If it is the case that no statement takes the address of 
any stack variable in the function foo, then foo does not 
need Stack Guard protection. This is because any buffer 
overflow must attack an array, which is always a pointer. 
If an attack seeks to alter a variable in a function above 
foo on the stack, then it must come from below foo. 
But to get to the variable above foo it would have to 
go through the StackGuard protection that necessarily ex-
ists on the function below f 00 because of the array being 
overflowed. 
The information regarding whether any variable has 
been aliased is already available in gee, so it should be a 
simple matter to tum StackGuard protection off for func-
tions that do not need it. We are working on th is optimiza-
tion, and expect to have it available in a future release of 
StackGuard. 
5.4 Future Work 
StackGuard defends against stack smashing buffer 
overflow attacks that over-write the return address and in-
ject attack code. While this is the most common form of 
buffer overflow attack, it is not the only form, as illus-
trated by SuperProbe in Section 4.1. 
In the general case, buffer overflow attacks can write 
arbitrary data to arbitrary pieces of process state, with ar-
bitrary results limited only by the opportunities offered 
by buggy programs. However, some data structures are 
far easier to exploit than others. Notably, function point-
ers are highly susceptible to buffer overflow attack. An 
attacker could conceivably use a buffer overflow to over-
write a function pointer that is on the heap, pointing it to 
attack code injected into some other buffer on the heap. 
The attack code need not even overflow its buffer. 
We propose to treat this problem by extending Stack-
Guard to protect other data sensitive structures in addi-
tion to function return addresses. "Sensitive data struc-
tures" would include function pointers, as well as other 
structures as indicated by the programmer, or clues in the 
source code itself. 
This extension highlights a property of StackGuard, 
which is that it is "destination oriented." Rather than 
trying to prevent buffer overflow attacks at the source, 
StackGuard strives to defend that which the attacker 
wants to alter. Following the notion that a TCB should 
be small to be verifiable (and thus secure) we conjecture 
that the set of data structures needing defending is smaller 
than the set of data structures exposed to attackers. Thus 
it should be easier to defend critical data structures than 
to find all poorly defended interfaces. 
6 Related Work 
There have been several other efforts pertinent to the 
problem of buffer overflow attacks. Some are explicitly 
directed at the security problem, while others are more 
generally concerned with software correctness. This sec-
tion reviews some of these projects, and compares them 
against StackGuard. The result is not a conclusion of 
which approach is better, but rather a description of the 
different trade-off's that each approach provides. 
6.1 Non-Executable Stack 
"Solar Designer" has developed a Linux patch that 
makes the stack non-executable [6], precisely to address 
the stack smashing problem. This patch simply makes 
the stack portion of a user process's virtual address space 
non-executable, so that attack code injected onto the 
stack cannot be executed. This patch offers the advan-
tages of zero performance penalty, and that programs 
work and are protected without re-compilation. How-
ever, it does necessitate running a specially-patched ker-
nel, unless this extension is adopted as standard. 
This patch was non-trivial and non-obvious, for the 
following reasons: 
• gee uses executable stacks for function trampolines 
for nested functions . 
• Linux uses executable user stacks for signal han-
dling. 
• Functional programming languages, and some other 
programs, rely on executable stacks for run-time 
code generation. 
The patch addresses the problem of trampolines and 
other application use of executable stacks by detect-
ing such usage, and pennanently enabling an executable 
stack for that process. The patch deals with signal han-
dlers by dynamically enabling an executable stack only 
for the duration of the signal handler. Both of these com-
promises offer potential opportunities for intrusion, e.g. 
a buffer overflow vulnerability in a signal handler. 
In addition to the above vulnerabilities, making the 
stack non-executable fails to address the problem of 
buffer overflow attacks that do not place attack code on 
the stack. The attacker may inject the attack code into a 
heap-allocated or statically allocated buffer, and simply 
re-point a function return address or function pointer to 
point to the attack code. This is exactly the kind of attack 
brought against Perl as described in Section 4.1, and a 
non-executable stack is no more effective than the current 
StackGuard in stopping it. 
The attacker may not even need to inject attack code 
at all, if the right code fragment can be found within the 
body ofthe program itself. Thus additional protection for 
critical data structures such as function pointers and func-
tion return addresses, as described in Section 5.4. 
6.2 FreeBSD Stack Integrity Check 
Alexander Snarskii developed a FreeBSD patch [22] 
that does similar integrity checks to those used by the 
Canary variant of StackGuard. However, these integrity 
checks were non-portable, hard-coded in assembler, and 
embedded in 1 ibe. This method protects against stack 
smashing attacks inside libe, but is not as general as 
StackGuard. 
6.3 Array Bounds Checking for C 
Richard Jones and Paul Kelly have developed a gee 
patch [12] that does full array bounds checking for C pro-
grams. Programs compiled with this patch are compat-
ible with ordinary gee modules, because they have not 
changed the representation of pointers. Rather, they de-
rive a "base" pointer from each pointer expression, and 
check the attributes of that pointer to detennine whether 
the expression is within bounds. 
The perfonnance costs are substantial: a pointer-
intensive program (ijk matrix multiply) experienced 30 x 
slowdown. Since the slowdown is proportionate to 
pointer usage, which is quite common in privileged pro-
grams, this perfonnance penalty is particularly unfortu-
nate. 
However, this method is strictly more secure than 
StackGuard, because it will prevent all buffer overflow 
attacks, not just those that attempt to alter return ad-
dresses, or other data structures that are perceived to be 
sensitive (see Section 5.4). Thus we propose that pro-
grams compiled with the bounds-checking compiler be 
treated as the "backing store" for MemGuard-protected 
programs, just as MemGuard-protected programs are the 
back-up plan for Canary-protected programs (see Sec-
tion 3.3). 
6.4 Memory Access Checking 
PurifY [10] is a debugging tool for C programs with 
memory access errors. PurifY uses "object code inser-
tion" to instrument all memory accesses. The approach 
is similar to StackGuard, in that it does integrity checking 
of memory, but it does so on each memory access, rather 
than on each function return. As a reSUlt. Purify is both 
more general and more expensive than StackGuard, im-
posing a slowdown of 2 to 5 times the execution time of 
optimized code, making PurifY more suitable for debug-
ging software. StackGuard, in contrast, is intended to be 
left on for production use of the compiled code. 
6.S Type-Safe Languages 
All of the vulnerabilities described here result from the 
lack of type safety in C. If the only operations that can be 
performed on a variable are those described by the type, 
then it is not possible to use creative input applied to vari-
able foo to make arbitrary changes to the variable bar. 
Type-safety is one of the foundations of the Java secu-
rity model. Unfortunately, errors in the Java type check-
ing system are one of the ways that Java programs and 
Java virtual machines can be attacked [5, 20). If the cor-
rectness of the type checking system is in question, then 
programs depending on that type checking system for se-
curity benefit from these techniques in similar ways to 
the benefit provided to type-unsafe programs. Applying 
StackGuard techniques to Java programs and Java virtual 
machines may yield beneficial results. 
7 Conclusions 
We have presented StackGuard, a systematic compiler 
tool that prevents a broad class of buffer overflow secu-
rity attacks from succeeding. We presented both security 
and performance analysis of the tool. Because the tool is 
oblivious to the specific attack and vulnerability being ex-
ploited, it is expected that this tool will also be able to stop 
buffer overflow attacks that have yet to be discovered, re-
ducing the need for constant, rapid patching of software 
to stay secure. 
In its most basic form, the tool requires only re-
compilation to make a program largely secure against 
buffer overflow attacks. In more elaborate forms, it pro-
vides an adaptive response to buffer overflow attacks, al-
lowing systems to be configured to trade performance for 
survivability. We concluded with discussion on how to 
generalize these techniques to other areas of security vul-
nerability. 
8 Availability 
StackGuard is a small set of patches to gee. 
We are releasing StackGuard under the Gnu Pub-
lic License, while retaining copyright to OGI. 
StackGuard is available both as a patch to gee 
2.7.2.2, and as a complete tar file, at this location: 
http://www/ese.ogi.edu/DISC/projeets/ 
immunix/StaekGuard/. 
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